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Abstract
The Audit Regulation was adopted in 2014 to address many of the perceived fail-
ings in the market for statutory audits. It introduced mandatory audit firm rotation 
for public-interest entities, including listed companies, as of 17 June 2020/2023. 
Mandatory audit firm rotation was also considered by the Dutch legislator in 2012. 
Therefore, many Dutch listed companies had already switched audit firm in antici-
pation of the national requirement. In this article, we investigate the effects of man-
datory audit firm rotation in the Netherlands by examining the financial reports of 
Dutch listed firms over the financial years 2012–2016 and by conducting a survey 
among stakeholders. We conclude that there is broad support for mandatory audit 
firm rotation in the Netherlands. Although mandatory audit firm rotation was seen 
as controversial at the time of adoption, it is now considered desirable by various 
stakeholders, including auditors themselves. However, mandatory audit firm rotation 
appears to have had some adverse effects. Most notably, our study shows a higher 
probability of errors in first year audits. The discount in audit fees provided by audit 
firms to lucrative larger public-interest entities for first year audits—the trophy client 
effect—may exacerbate the negative effect on audit quality. The Audit Regulation’s 
goals to improve the market for statutory audits have not been met so far.
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1 Introduction
During the last decade, the quality of statutory audits of listed companies has regu-
larly been questioned. This occurs in particular if a company faces financial dis-
tress or fraud, and audit reports of previous financial years did not provide any clue 
as to the mounting problems. Recent examples in the UK are the collapse of the 
construction group Carillon and the pension scandal at British Home Stores (BHS). 
Other cases include a corruption scandal at the oil company Petrobras in Brazil, and 
accounting irregularities at the retail company Steinhoff in the Netherlands/South 
Africa.
After the financial crisis, the European legislator tried to address many of the per-
ceived failings in the market for statutory audits by adopting the Audit Regulation of 
2014.1 The Audit Regulation became effective from 17 June 2016.
One of the measures in the Audit Regulation is mandatory audit firm rotation 
for public-interest entities (hereafter PIEs), which include listed companies.2 This 
means that listed companies should rotate from audit firm after a certain period of 
time. In other words, there is a maximum duration of the audit engagement. The 
assumption is that long-lasting audit engagements result in audit firms being less 
independent and less critical, ultimately leading to lower quality audits. Moreover, 
mandatory rotation could improve competition in the market for statutory audits.3 
The so-called Big Four audit firms—Deloitte, EY, KPMG and PwC—dominate this 
market, which is seen as undesirable, as a sufficient choice of audit firms is assumed 
to be required in order to ensure a smooth functioning of capital markets.4
Introducing mandatory audit firm rotation was also considered by the Dutch leg-
islator in 2012, independently from the European legislator. For quite some time, it 
was expected that the said Dutch national legislation would apply as of 1 January 
2014, which date was later postponed to 1 January 2016. Ultimately, the Dutch leg-
islator conformed to the Audit Regulation and dropped the national requirement in 
September 2015. The Audit Regulation does not require listed companies to rotate 
from audit firm as of 2014 or 2016, but grants them time until 17 June 2020/2023.5 
However, many Dutch listed companies already rotated from audit firm in anticipa-
tion of the national requirement which was expected to apply much earlier. Thus, in 
1 Council Regulation (EU) 537/2014 on specific requirements regarding statutory audit of public-interest 
entities [2014] OJ 158/77 (hereafter Audit Regulation).
2 Art. 17 Audit Regulation. For the definition of PIEs, see Art. 2 Council Directive 2006/43/EC [2006] 
OJ 157/87 (hereafter Audit Directive), as amended by Council Directive 2014/56/EU [2014] OJ L 
158/196. In this article we focus on ‘entities governed by the law of a Member State whose transferable 
securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market of any Member State within the meaning of point 
14 of Art. 4(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC’, as mentioned in this Art. 2.
3 See recital 21 of the Audit Regulation.
4 See recital 30 of the Audit Regulation and SEC(2011) 1384 final, pp 17 et seq., 8, 29 (hereafter the 
European Commission Impact Assessment).
5 Art. 41 Audit Regulation. As from 17 June 2020, audit engagements cannot be entered into or renewed 
if the auditor or audit firm has been providing audit services for 20 and more consecutive years at the 
date of entry into force of the Regulation. As from 17 June 2023, this applies if audit services have been 
provided for 11 and more but less than 20 consecutive years at the date of entry into force.
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the Netherlands we experienced about 5 years of (anticipated) mandatory audit firm 
rotations.
In this article, we investigate the effects of (anticipated) mandatory audit firm 
rotation in the Netherlands. By doing so, our aim is to answer the question to what 
extent the goals in the Audit Regulation have been achieved. Before the adoption 
of the Audit Regulation, mandatory audit firm rotation within the EU only existed 
in Italy. The Italian experience was taken into account when designing the Audit 
Regulation.
First, we briefly analyze the Audit Regulation. Its background, goals and meas-
ures relating to mandatory audit firm rotation will be discussed (Sect. 2). Next, we 
will present the experiences with mandatory audit firm rotation in the Netherlands. 
We conducted empirical research by studying annual financial reports of listed com-
panies over the period 2012–2016, and by conducting a survey among stakeholders 
(Sect. 3). We will discuss the relevance of the outcomes for the EU and its member 
states (Sect. 4). The article finishes with our conclusion (Sect. 5).
2  Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation: The Audit Regulation and Dutch 
Law
2.1  The Audit Regulation
2.1.1  Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation: Background, Advantages and Aims
The Audit Regulation was preceded by a thorough European Commission Impact 
Assessment, which discusses the pros and cons of mandatory audit firm rotation.6 
According to the European Commission, one of the threats to the independence of 
auditors is the ‘familiarity’ threat.7 The auditor may be too sympathetic to the inter-
ests of the company in the case of a close and long relationship. Also, the audit work 
tends to concentrate on routine and a repetition of the previous year audit, so that the 
auditor no longer has a fresh view to suggest improvements. Academic studies show 
that long engagement terms are more likely to increase ‘materiality’ thresholds, and 
a higher probability of favourable auditors’ reports.8 Some believe that regular man-
datory rotation will also promote scrutiny of the auditor’s work by the next incom-
ing auditor, which may give the auditor incentives to do a better job.9
In many countries, companies have been audited by the same audit firm for dec-
ades. This might be an inherent risk of the current system in which (the general 
6 The European Commission Impact Assessment, pp 26, 37–45, 171–177.
7 The other threats are the provision of non-audit services and the fact that the audited company selects 
and pays the auditor. If audit firms have an interest in securing additional revenue from the provision 
of other non-audit services, this could jeopardize professional skepticism when conducting the statutory 
audit. When the auditor is de facto selected and paid by the audited firm’s management, this undermines 
the auditor’s independence. We do not further discuss these issues.
8 E.g. Arel et al. (2005), cited by the European Commission Impact Assessment.
9 Hoyle (1978), cited by the European Commission Impact Assessment.
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meeting of) the audited company, based on a proposal of the audited company’s 
supervisory board and a recommendation made by the audit committee,10 selects the 
audit firm and the auditor. Moreover, in the current system there is (the perception 
of) an undesirable situation of the audited company paying the auditor. One of the 
specific objectives of the Audit Regulation is to mitigate the risks of this (perceived) 
dependency relation in the system (the so-called familiarity threat) by reinforcing 
the independence and professional scepticism of statutory auditors and audit firms 
when conducting statutory audits to PIEs. Mandatory audit firm rotation is believed 
to be one of the measures, aiming to reduce and mitigate the risk of a lack of inde-
pendency and professional scepticism.
Barriers to entry into the statutory audit market for PIEs are also considered a 
problem, according to the European Commission. The choice of a PIE for an audit 
firm to conduct a statutory audit is effectively limited to the Big Four audit firms, 
or even more limited if one of the Big Four audit firms already provides other ser-
vices to the said PIE. In 2011, the market share of the Big Four audit firms exceeded 
85% in the vast majority of member states.11 As a result, large audit firms may be 
too big to fail, and the market structure may induce a moral hazard whereby public 
authorities could be required to save an audit firm or display regulatory forbearance. 
Consequently, a specific objective of the Audit Regulation is to improve the condi-
tions of the market for statutory audits of PIEs by facilitating the rotation of audit 
firms, facilitating an objective choice of audit firms and increasing the choice of 
audit firms.12
Regarding the goals of mandatory audit firm rotation, the Audit Regulation’s 
recital 21 states:
In order to address the familiarity threat and therefore reinforce the inde-
pendence of statutory auditors and audit firms, it is important to establish a 
maximum duration of the audit engagement of a statutory auditor or an audit 
firm in a particular audited entity. In addition, as a means of strengthening 
the independence of the statutory auditor or the audit firm, reinforcing pro-
fessional scepticism, and increasing audit quality, this Regulation provides for 
the following alternatives for an extension of the maximum duration: regular 
and open mandatory retendering or the appointment of more than one statu-
tory auditor or audit firm by public-interest entities. Also, the involvement of 
smaller audit firms in these measures would facilitate the development of the 
capacity of such firms, thus broadening the choice of statutory auditors and 
audit firms for public-interest entities. It is also important to provide for an 
appropriate period within which such statutory auditor or audit firm may not 
carry out the statutory audit of the same entity. In order to ensure a smooth 
transition, the former statutory auditor should transfer a hand-over file with 
relevant information to the incoming statutory auditor.
10 Art. 37 Audit Directive and Art. 16 Audit Regulation.
11 The European Commission Impact Assessment, pp 8–9.
12 Ibid., p 26. See also Köhler, Quick and Willekens (2016).
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Hence, the following (related) goals of the Audit Regulation can be extracted, 
which goals have been part of our empirical analysis in the Netherlands (Sect. 3):
– reducing the familiarity threat;
– reinforcing professional skepticism;
– reinforcing the independence of audit firms;
– increasing audit quality; and
– broadening the choice of statutory auditors and audit firms for PIEs (through 
improving market structure).
The Audit Regulation introduced a combination of measures to achieve these 
goals:
– a maximum duration of the audit engagement (10 years is the default);
– an extension of this maximum by a qualified form of retendering or by the 
appointment of a second audit firm;
– a cooling-off period (4 years is the default) within which the audit firm cannot 
carry out an audit.
The requirement of key partner rotation within an audit firm—which was already 
mandatory due to the Audit Directive—is also upheld in the Audit Regulation. We 
will discuss this package of measures in detail in Sect. 2.1.3.
2.1.2  Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation: Disadvantages
It is admitted in the European Commission Impact Assessment that mandatory 
audit firm rotation is controversial and has attracted opposition from many stake-
holders, including auditors and the European Parliament.13 Some opponents believe 
that partner rotation (instead of firm rotation) is sufficient to deal with independence 
concerns. Moreover, it is argued that the experience in Italy—the only member state 
that had a requirement of mandatory audit firm rotation in place before the adoption 
of the Audit Regulation—has not been unanimously positive and the Italian market 
is as concentrated as the audit market in other member states.14
The European Commission recognized that mandatory audit firm rotation may 
have certain disadvantages and leads to additional costs for both PIEs and audit 
firms.15 There could be additional initial costs in the first year of a statutory audit 
mandate. Audit firms will need to invest to gather sufficient knowledge with regard 
to their new audit client. It also takes time to become familiar with the special pro-
cedures, systems and recent history of the entity.16 As audit firms constantly need to 
13 The European Commission Impact Assessment, pp 172–175.
14 SDA Università Bocconi (2002); Cameran et al. (2005), pp 37–38, 42.
15 The European Commission Impact Assessment, pp 174–175.
16 See a.o. Lee et al. (2009); Dao and Pham (2014).
 B. de Jong et al.
123
recoup start-up costs and efforts, this may lead to a less critical attitude.17 PIEs will 
also incur additional costs to assist the new audit firm. According to the European 
Commission, the frequency of audit firm rotation should not be too high to take into 
account these additional costs during the first or second year audit. Moreover, the 
European Commission argues that the initial time period for the engagement should 
not be for less than 5 years and a possibility to renew the contract should be given 
once.18
Another concern raised in the literature is that audit firm rotation leads to a loss 
of knowledge of the audited firm and the industry. The previous auditor had firm-
specific knowledge, which is lost due to rotation. There is some empirical evidence 
that there is a higher risk of audit failure due to this lack of firm-specific knowl-
edge.19 According to the European Commission, it is therefore important that the 
incoming auditor has access to a hand-over file prepared by the outgoing auditor. A 
joint audit is also seen as a solution to minimize this risk. Regarding industry knowl-
edge, the European Commission observes that this knowledge can also be obtained 
by working with external specialists.20
Regarding market structure, a study by Bocconi21 found that mandatory audit 
firm rotation in Italy did not have much impact on the level of competition, nor did it 
give medium-sized audit firms the opportunity to compete against large audit firms 
for contracts with PIEs. A related concern is that mandatory audit firm rotation 
may lead to a lack of choice when appointing a new auditor.22 Experience in Italy 
and South Korea suggests that rotation might indeed decrease rather than increase 
market competition.23 According to the European Commission, the requirement 
of a mandatory audit firm should be accompanied by other measures such as man-
datory tendering in such a way that smaller and medium-sized audit firms are not 
precluded. The Audit Regulation introduced such a tendering process.24 However, 
the question remains whether smaller audit firms have sufficient incentives to par-
ticipate, considering the costs of tendering, the complexity of conducting audits at 
PIEs, potential (unlimited) liability, the level of regulatory oversight, and the level 
of fees.
2.1.3  The Rotation Requirement and Member State Options
Article 17 of the Audit Regulation contains the main provisions on mandatory audit 
firm rotation. The Audit Regulation stipulates both a minimum and a maximum 
duration period of audit engagements. A PIE should appoint an audit firm for an ini-
tial engagement of at least 1 year, which may be renewed. Member states are given 
17 Evidence for this argument is mixed, see Ewelt-Knauer et al. (2012), p 7; Cameran et al. (2005), p 40.
18 The European Commission Impact Assessment, p 175.
19 Ewelt-Knauer et al. (2012), pp 7, 26–30.
20 The European Commission Impact Assessment, p 175.
21 SDA Università Bocconi (2002); Cameran et al. (2005), p 42.
22 The European Commission Impact Assessment, p 175.
23 Ewelt-Knauer et al. (2012), p 34.
24 Art. 16(3) Audit Regulation.
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the option to require that the initial engagement should be for a period of more than 
1 year, however.
The maximum duration for the audit engagement is 10  years.25 Member states 
are allowed to reduce this period.26 They are also allowed to increase the period 
under certain conditions.27 An extension to 20 years is allowed if a public tendering 
process is conducted in accordance with the Audit Regulation’s requirements. Alter-
natively, an extension to 24 years is allowed if more than one statutory auditor is 
simultaneously engaged after the first period, leading to a joint audit report. In both 
cases an extension is only possible if the general meeting of shareholders approves 
the proposal for renewing the engagement.28 A further extension of at most 2 years 
can be granted by the competent authority, i.e. the supervisor, after a request by the 
PIE in exceptional cases.29
The Audit Regulation requires the outgoing auditor or audit firm to prepare 
a hand-over file and to provide the incoming statutory auditor or audit firm with 
access to all relevant information concerning the audited entity and concerning 
the most recent audit of that entity.30 Any information that has been transmitted to 
supervisors should also be made available to the incoming audit firm.31
2.2  Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation in the Netherlands
Prior to the adoption of the Audit Regulation, the Dutch legislator already consid-
ered introducing a mandatory audit firm rotation requirement in Dutch law. The 
requirement of mandatory audit firm rotation was suggested in 2012 and was sub-
sequently adopted in national legislation for PIEs.32 The originally intended date of 
application of this requirement was 1 January 2014. PIEs were to be required to 
change from audit firm after eight consecutive years to prevent too much involve-
ment and familiarity of the audit firm with the PIE. This proposed Dutch maxi-
mum duration of audit engagements was shorter than the 10 year default maximum 
period in the Audit Regulation, although the Audit Regulation also allows a shorter 
engagement period as a member state option. Furthermore, the Dutch requirement 
was planned to apply much earlier than the date on which the requirements in the 
Audit Regulation entered into force (i.e. 17 June 2016). It could thus be said that, 
in advance of the realization of the mandatory audit firm requirement in the Audit 
25 Art. 17(1) Audit Regulation.
26 Art. 17(2)(b) Audit Regulation.
27 Art. 17(4) Audit Regulation.
28 Art. 17(5) Audit Regulation, which states that the extension can be done ‘only if, upon a recommen-
dation of the audit committee, the administrative or supervisory body, proposes to the general meeting 
of shareholders or members, in accordance with national law, that the engagement be renewed and that 
proposal is approved’.
29 Art. 17(6) Audit Regulation.
30 Art. 18 Audit Regulation.
31 Art. 18(2) Audit Regulation.
32 The requirement was introduced in the Audit Firms Supervision Act (Wet toezicht accountantsorgani-
saties; Staatsblad 2012, no. 681).
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Regulation, the Dutch government already showed its belief in the beneficial effects 
of mandatory audit firm rotation.
In light of preventing inconsistencies between the proposed requirement in the 
Netherlands and the coming obligation in the Audit Regulation, the date of applica-
tion of the requirement in Dutch law was at first delayed from 1 January 2014 to 
1 January 2016. Although the Dutch Parliament considered it necessary to imple-
ment the requirement of mandatory audit firm rotation directly, when the Audit Reg-
ulation was adopted it was finally—in the autumn of 2015—decided not have the 
national legislation on mandatory audit firm rotation becoming applicable at all and 
to have this subject regulated exclusively by the Audit Regulation.
The Dutch government did not make use of the member state options in the Audit 
Regulation. Thus, in the Netherlands there is no possibility to extend the maximum 
period for the audit engagement after 10 years. There is also no possibility for PIEs 
to request the national supervisor for an extension. Perhaps surprisingly, the original 
8 year maximum period that was envisaged in national legislation was also aban-
doned. The Netherlands conformed to the 10 year default maximum period in the 
Audit Regulation. However, rotation of the key partner responsible for carrying out 
a statutory audit is required every 5 years in the Netherlands, where the Audit Regu-
lation’s default for rotation of key partners is seven years.33
Although in the Netherlands the national legislation in the final stage was aban-
doned, a rotation ‘wave’ had already occurred in anticipation of the expected dead-
line of—at first—1 January 2014 and—subsequently—1 January 2016. Nowadays, 
the Audit Regulation grants PIEs, also in the Netherlands, a much longer period to 
rotate from audit firm.34 The relatively large number of audit firm rotations in antici-
pation of the expected national legislation has allowed us to carry out an empirical 
study of the effects of (mandatory) audit firm rotation.
3  The Effects of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation in the Netherlands
3.1  Research Design and Methodology
3.1.1  Dual Methodology
Our empirical study of the effects of mandatory audit firm rotation in the Nether-
lands was carried out by using a dual methodology. It the first place, we studied the 
publicly available annual reports35 for the financial years 2012–2016 for companies 
incorporated in the Netherlands whose (depositary receipts for) shares are listed on 
the Dutch stock exchange Euronext Amsterdam. In addition, we conducted survey 
research by distributing a questionnaire among different stakeholders. By combining 
33 Art. 17(7) Audit Regulation.
34 Art. 41 Audit Regulation.
35 We mean the combination of the financial statements, the management report, statements by responsi-
ble persons, and the auditor report. See Art. 4 Council Directive 2004/109/EC [2004] OJ L 390/38.
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these methodologies, the effects of audit firm rotation could be researched more 
comprehensively.
3.1.2  Study of Annual Financial Reports, Proxies and Audit Fees
By studying the annual reports over the financial years 2012–2016, we assessed 
which Dutch listed companies changed from audit firm during this period. In each 
financial year we examined various proxies that could possibly be an indication 
of the independence of the audit firm and/or the quality of the audit performed by 
the auditor.36 A proxy is a possible indicator that is used when the variable to be 
assessed is not (easily) operationalized and measured. This is certainly the case with 
the independence of audit firms and audit quality, as audit quality is considered to be 
a so-called credence good37 and because of the lack of publicly available informa-
tion to assess audit independence and audit quality.
Typically, four different types of proxies are commonly used to study the effect of 
audit firm rotation on audit quality.38 These proxies differ from assessing audit and 
going concern opinions, to measuring audit failures (in retrospect) and the audited 
company’s accrual accounting behaviour.39 We used a mixture of these types of 
proxies commonly used to study audit firm independence and/or audit quality.40 
Specifically, we examined:
1. The return of an audit assignment by the auditor or the withdrawal thereof by 
the listed company, since this may indicate that the auditor or the company do not 
agree on the conditions or the execution of the audit assignment;
2. The lack of an unqualified opinion by the auditor (in the sense of Art. 2:393 
para. 6 Dutch Civil Code), since this may form an indication of the level of 
‘severity’ of the auditor;
3. The inclusion of an emphasis of matter in the auditor’s report, since this may 
form an indication of the level of ‘severity’ of the auditor;
4. A delay in the publication of the annual reports in relation to the statutory 
period or the earlier announcement by the listed company, since this may be due 
to the level of ‘severity’ of the auditor41;
5. The issuance of a profit warning or recognition of an impairment by the listed 
company, since this may be instigated by the auditor;
37 Knechel (2016).
38 Ewelt-Knauer et al. (2012), pp 24–30.
39 Accruals relate to the difference between reported cash flows and the accruals-based income state-
ment.
40 We did not include a formal analysis of accruals.
41 Abma (2015), p 537.
36 Audit independence and audit quality are related to each other. See for example the definition of audit 
quality by DeAngelo (1981), p 186: ‘the market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both 
(a) discover a breach in the client’s accounting system, and (b) report the breach.’.
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6. Whether an adjustment of accounting principles was implemented (and 
whether or not this was reported to the supervisor for the financial markets as 
‘inside information’ by the listed company), since this may be instigated by the 
auditor;
7. The inclusion of key audit matters (‘KAMs’) in the audit report by the auditor, 
which deviates from the risks mentioned in the report of the management board 
and the supervisory board of the listed company, since this may suggest that the 
auditor and the management board and/or supervisory board disagree about the 
matters that were most significant during the audit of the financial statements.42
In addition, we examined (the change in) the auditor’s fee in connection with the 
audit of the financial statements (audit fees) during the various financial years. The 
level (and change) of the audit fees may also give an indication of the quality of the 
audit, whereby it is assumed that lower fees negatively affect audit quality.
Our considerations for using these proxies and audit fees are that they are meas-
urable and can be distilled from public data. They also tie in with the methodology 
used in international research discussed above. We did not have access to non-public 
information during our research. A drawback of (some of) the proxies we used is 
that they are not perfect measuring instruments, as the occurrence of a certain proxy 
does not necessarily demonstrate auditor independence or quality. For example, a 
profit warning (proxy 5) could have been instigated by the auditor, but may also be 
unrelated to the auditor’s behaviour.
The proxies involved in our research always assume a value of 0 (‘does not 
occur’) or 1 (‘occurs’). Only the examined audit fees are not encoded in our database 
as a digital 0/1-variable, but as a continuous variable.
For our analysis, we compared the proxies in the financial year prior to rotation 
of the audit firm (last year audit, ‘LYA’), the financial year after rotation of the audit 
firm (first year audit, ‘FYA’) and the financial year in which the decision for rotation 
was taken or announced (decision year audit, ‘DYA’) with the other ‘regular’ finan-
cial years during the analyzed period 2012–2016.43 In other words, we compared the 
existence of circumstances that trigger one or more of the aforementioned proxies 
during the financial years LYA, FYA or DYA with the existence of such circum-
stances during the regular years (see Sect. 3.2.2 et seq.).
3.1.3  Survey Research
Within the survey study, we used an online questionnaire.44 The questionnaire was 
distributed to relevant stakeholders in September and October 2017. Among these 
stakeholders were (with the number of respondents in brackets):
42 Note that the requirement to disclose KAMs in the audit report for Dutch listed companies is effective 
as of the financial year 2014.
43 The DYA represents the year in which the general meeting of the audited company formally appoints 
the auditor. Since it is common practice for listed companies to elect the auditor for the current financial 
year, DYA is often similar to FYA. We however also observed DYAs which were not equal to FYA or 
LYA, probably because the competition related to the mandatory audit firm rotation forced companies to 
anticipate audit firm rotation early on.
44 For the questionnaire and response rates, see: https ://doi.org/10.17026 /dans-zab-7twx.
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– regulators and supervisors (8);
– auditors, authorized to perform statutory audits at PIEs (hereafter PIE auditors; 
73);
– auditors, not authorized to perform statutory audits at PIEs (24);
– audited companies or institutions, which are PIEs (22);
– audited companies or institutions, not PIEs (21); and
– users of annual accounts, including interest groups such as the Dutch investor 
association (VEB) and its members and Eumedion, which represents institutional 
investors (64).
The questionnaire could be filled in anonymously, so that stakeholders could feel 
free to answer truthfully. The questionnaire contained 25 questions relating to the 
maximum duration for statutory audit engagements, the requirements on the cool-
ing-off period and aspects of the regular and mandatory (re)tenders as included in 
the Audit Regulation. A total of 278 respondents answered one or more questions. 
171 respondents fully completed the survey (62% of the 278). The results were 
examined statistically (if there were sufficient observations) and/or qualitatively.
3.2  Research Outcomes Based on Yearly Financial Reports 2012–2016
3.2.1  Number and Types of Rotations
In total, 74 out of 114 Dutch listed companies rotated from audit firm at least once 
during the period under review (financial years 2012–2016). In addition, five compa-
nies rotated a second time during this period—and thus at least once ‘voluntarily’.45
The development of audit firm rotation started mainly from (the audit of the 
annual financial statements for) the 2014 financial year, i.e. the calendar year 2015. 
Prior to that, only 13% of the total number of rotations had taken place. With regard 
to some of the rotations, explicit justification has been disclosed by the listed com-
pany referring to the (proposed) legislation that would make this compulsory. Fig-
ure 1 shows the number of rotations per financial year.
3.2.2  The Proxies: Few Relate to Audit Firm Rotation
We present an overview with univariate results in the Annex. For most of the indi-
vidual proxies that we used, no statistical relationship with (mandatory) firm rota-
tion exists. The only exception is the fifth proxy: issuing a profit warning or the 
recognition of an impairment. This was the case in 14% of the annual financial 
45 Strictly speaking, all rotations during the period under review were voluntary. However, as discussed 
earlier in Sect. 2.2, there are good reasons to consider all rotations in this period mandatory, since the 
vast majority of Dutch listed companies already rotated from audit firm in anticipation of the national 
requirement which required PIEs to rotate from audit firm.
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statements (i.e. 48 times) in the financial years during the whole period under review 
(2012–2016). For this proxy we have performed a regression analysis using a logit 
model. With a logit model, the dependent variable takes only two values. In this 
case, it is the occurrence or non-occurrence of the profit warning or impairment. 
Using the model, the probability can be estimated that a profit warning or impair-
ment occurs in the different types of audit years (LYA, FYA or DYA compared to 
other years). The results of this analysis are shown in Table 1.
The results show that the probability of a profit warning or impairment is signifi-
cantly lower in a LYA than in an audit year that does not qualify as LYA (‘a non-
LYA’).46 For the other special types of audit years (FYA and DYA), no statistical 
relationship with audit firm rotation could be established.
Our initial hypothesis was that auditors would have a stricter attitude, i.e. a more 
independent or less familiar attitude towards the audited company in a LYA, since in 
that year there is not much more to be gained with customer-friendliness and there 
is still a reputational risk in the event of audit failures, e.g. in case of undiscovered 
fraud. This could result in an auditor who exerts more pressure on (the manage-
ment of) an audited company to issue a profit warning or to recognize an impair-
ment loss. On the basis of the results depicted in Table 1, it can be doubted whether 
this hypothesis can still hold true; the likelihood of a profit warning or impairment 
occurring in a LYA is significantly lower than in other audit years (non-LYA). It 
might suggest that the interest of performing a good audit in DYA is lower, as the 
auditor knows that its appointment will not be renewed. This conclusion could be a 
point of attention for audit firms, users of annual financial statements and the Dutch 
supervisor of audit firms, as well as the Netherlands Authority for the Financial 
Markets (hereafter AFM).
Regarding the other proxies, some findings are worth mentioning, even though 
a formal or statistical relationship with audit firm rotation could not be established. 
In at least 17 FYAs (23%), the FYA itself (and therefore audit firm rotation) was 
considered by the auditor as KAM in the audit report (proxy 7).47 In eight of these 
cases, this concerned a company being part of the AEX index.48 In six of these fif-
teen cases (40%), the KAM was presented more prominently in the FYA than the 
other KAMs by mentioning it first in the audit report, which could possibly be inter-
preted as that FYA being regarded as the most important KAM that year.49 In vir-
tually all cases where the FYA has been included as a KAM by the auditor, the 
acquisition of knowledge regarding the company, its environment and internal risk 
management and control systems is the most important part of the FYA in the KAM 
46 Only in case of LYA, the null hypothesis that no relationship exists may be rejected on a 95% confi-
dence interval. The results suggest that the probability that a profit warning or impairment occurs in a 
LYA is significantly lower than in other years.
47 We note that the regulatory framework regarding the disclosure of KAMs in the audit reports changed 
significantly during 2012–2016.
48 The AEX index, derived from the Amsterdam Exchange index, is the stock market index composed of 
the 25 companies with the largest market capitalization on Euronext Amsterdam.
49 See Standard 705 of the International Standards on Auditing (ISA).
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(14 times). This is followed by the audit of the opening balance (12 times) and the 
discussion with the previous auditor (11 times).
3.2.3  Audit Fees: An Anomaly in First Year Audits
In the period under review we examined the auditor’s remuneration related to the 
audit of the financial statements of a company (the audit fees). Audit fees must be 
distinguished from an auditor’s total remuneration, which may also include fees for 
other work performed by an audit firm (e.g. tax advisory services or other non-statu-
tory audit services). Note, however, that (lower) audit fees may be compensated with 
(higher) fees for non-audit services. But since the Dutch legislator introduced a pro-
hibition for all types of non-audit services to audited PIEs in 2013, this risk should 
be largely mitigated.50
In general, we found an upward trend in audit fees; audit fees increase every 
year. An exception to this is the amount of audit fees in the FYA. We found that 
the median change in audit fees in an FYA compared to the previous year (LYA) is 
Fig. 1  Number of audit firm rotations per financial year
Table 1  Logit regression results 
on proxy 5, issuing a profit 
warning or recognizing an 
impairment
Sig Coëfficiënt Exp (Coëfficiënt)
FYA 0.071 − 1.068 0.344
LYA 0.034 − 1.075 0.341
DYA 0.205 0.608 1.837
Constant 0.000 − 1.552 0.212
50 Art. 24b Audit Firms Supervision Act. The prohibition introduced in the Audit Firms Supervision did 
not only enter into force at an earlier moment than the provisions introduced in the Audit Regulation with 
regard to providing non-audit services to audited PIEs; the prohibition in Art. 24b of the Audit Firms 
Supervision Act is also more stringent.
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− 4.04% versus 0.37%. The changes over the different types of audit years are shown 
in Fig. 2.
For Dutch companies in the AEX index, the average (median) of the change in 
audit fees in FYAs was significantly lower than for other Dutch listed companies: 
− 9.4% (− 6.6%) versus 16.3% (0.9%). In two other studies this is referred to as the 
‘trophy client effect’.51 For audit firms, so-called AEX companies seem to be impor-
tant clients (‘trophies’), which means that the audit firm seems to be willing to offer 
(at least for the FYA) lower fees in order to be given the assignment for conducting 
the statutory audit.
Finally, it is remarkable that in at least one case it is explained during the gen-
eral meeting of the company that audit firm rotation has been used to reduce the 
scope of the audit engagement (the audit scope) to the minimum of activities that 
are required. In that case, the scope—and therefore: the number—of statutory audits 
of other subsidiaries of the group of the listed company was limited to the required 
minimum level. This may be an adverse consequence of audit firm rotation and it 
may have occurred in other cases of audit firm rotation as well, without third parties 
being well informed. These kinds of adverse consequences of audit firm rotation 
should be taken into account when evaluating the Audit Regulation as well.
3.3  Survey Research Outcomes
3.3.1  Requirements in the Audit Regulation Largely Considered Desirable
The package of requirements introduced by the Audit Regulation and the choices 






LYA-2 LYA-1 LYA FYA FYA+1 FYA+2
Avg. % Mdn. % Avg. % (excl. 5% outliers) Mdn. %  (excl. 5% outliers)
Fig. 2  Development of audit fees—compared to previous audit years (%)
51 Abma (2017); Kevelam et al. (2017).
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respondents to what extent they endorse the individual requirements and choices. 
We examined whether the averages of the answers given by the respondents differed 
significantly from the average value of 3 (‘neither agree nor disagree’) using a two-
tailed t-test. The results are shown in Table 2.
A statistically significant majority of the respondents consider a maximum period 
for statutory audits to be desirable. This is perhaps surprising, given that a substan-
tial proportion of the respondents consist of auditors, who in general have a less 
positive attitude towards the requirement of mandatory audit firm rotation. The 
maximum duration of 10 years of an audit engagement, as stipulated by the Audit 
Regulation, was not judged as being too long by a statistically significant majority. 
This could be an indication that a stricter and shorter maximum period for audit 
engagements is not considered desirable. Compared to other respondents, a signifi-
cant amount of PIE auditors disagreed with the statement that the maximum dura-
tion of 10 years of an audit engagement is too long, according to a breakdown of the 
background of the respondents (footnote a of Table 2). This indicates that PIE audi-
tors are probably in favour of a longer maximum period for audit engagements than 
other respondents.
A cooling-off period of 4 years is not seen as too short by a significant major-
ity of the respondents. Again, PIE auditors significantly disagreed more with this 
statement than other respondents (footnote b of Table  2). Based on these results, 
there seems to be no reason to introduce a longer cooling-off period in the Audit 
Regulation.
With regard to the two member state options, we questioned to what extent the 
respondents agreed with the choices made by the Dutch legislator not to transpose 
these options in Dutch legislation. A statistically significant majority of the respond-
ents endorsed the decision not to allow the rotation period to be extended to 20 years 
in the event of a public tender. Regarding the choice not to allow the AFM to extend 
the audit engagement by 2 years following a request from the PIE, divergent answers 
were given by respondents.
Some of the respondents added some noteworthy explanations for their answers. 
For example, a respondent pointed out the need for flexibility in relation to the oli-
gopoly of the Big Four audit firms regarding the previous subjects:
In order to maintain flexibility and with due regard to the public interest, it is 
desirable that, possibly after consultation with the AFM, the cooling-off period 
may be reduced or the maximum period may be extended.
Another respondent also points out that the supervisory board or the audit com-
mittee of the company should be responsible for determining the maximum duration 
of the audit engagement. This respondent is in favour of a maximum period with a 
comply-or-explain nature. Although these respondents seem to concur with the prin-
ciple of the Audit Regulation that the duration of the audit engagement is desirable, 
they prefer more flexibility in the requirements of audit firm rotation than currently 
exists under the current rules of the Audit Regulation.
Respondents also describe the dynamics surrounding the rotation for an audit 
firm and the associated costs thereof:
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In practice, 3 years are required as an external auditor to properly understand 
an assignment and the dynamics of an organization. Then there is another 
4 years of a balanced situation, and in the last 2 years there is already a special 
dynamic of the impending farewell.
And:
There are huge costs associated with the rotation […] There also seems to be a 
high level of lowballing. This is evident not only from the realization of newly 
acquired orders (often 50% below cost at PIEs in the first year!), but also on 
the feedback from lost proposals, the reason for which is often the price.
All in all, it seems that although the majority of the respondents consider a maxi-
mum duration of audit engagements desirable, some of the respondents suggest that 
the costs associated with mandatory audit firm rotation justify a less rigid approach 
in the Audit Regulation. The desirability of such measures are worth being taken into 
account when evaluating the current audit rotation rules of the Audit Regulation.
3.3.2  Not All the Goals of the Audit Regulation are Met
We questioned the respondents to what extent they believe that the measures set 
out in the Audit Regulation contribute to the realization of their intended objec-
tives (Sect. 2.1.1). The results are shown in Table 3.
The results in Table 3 show that, according to a statistically significant major-
ity, the first three objectives of the Audit Regulation are achieved with the pack-
age of the introduced requirements. These requirements intend to limit the famili-
arity threat, and to increase the independence and professional-critical attitude of 
the auditor. The respondents do not agree on the contribution of the requirements 
to increasing the quality of the audit and promoting competition in the market 
of statutory audits. Finally, a significant majority of respondents believe that the 
requirements do not contribute to promoting the access of non-Big Four audit 
firms in the market of statutory audits at PIEs. PIE auditors are even more con-
vinced that the market of statutory audits at PIEs remains in the hands of the Big 
Four audit firms. According to the respondents, mandatory audit firm rotation did 
not enhance auditor choice.
There were some notable explanations about the perceived effectiveness of the 
Audit Regulation. Regarding the relationship between the positive and negative 
effects of audit firm rotation, it was for instance stated:
The risk of a lack of independence […] does not outweigh the loss of knowl-
edge as a result of rotation, the lack of motivation of the auditor in the last 
2 years of the audit, the extra efforts in the work of the new auditor and the 
time it takes for the new auditor to come to the same level of knowledge and 
insight as the previous auditor.
A respondent drew attention to the tension between the quality of the audit and 
the consequences of competition for audit fees:
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The competition leads to low fees, but a desire to increase quality does not 
fit with increasing budget pressure.
With regard to competition in the market for statutory audits for PIEs and bar-
riers for entering that market, it was noted that:
The limited number of audit firms that can audit PIEs is far too small, as a 
result of which they have obtained a legally protected monopoly position.
Furthermore:
 It promotes access because non-Big Four firms are invited to participate more 
often in a tender, even though the actual choice still often goes to a Big Four 
firm.
3.3.3  Adverse Effects: Lower Quality of the First Year Audit?
We assessed whether there is a difference in the quality of the audit in the different 
types of audit years that may be attributed to (mandatory) audit firm rotation. We 
have differentiated between FYAs, LYAs and DYAs. These special years have been 
examined in comparison with statutory audits conducted in other financial years.
Regarding the special years FYA, LYA and DYA, we questioned respondents 
whether or not compared to the ‘normal’ audit years:
1. the quality of the audit is higher;
2. the chance of errors during the audit is higher;
3. the statutory audit fees are higher;
4. the costs to be incurred in the context of the statutory audit are higher; and
5. the auditor is more independent.
The results of the answers to the questions regarding FYA are included in Table 4. 
The matrix shows that a statistically significant majority of the respondents are of 
the opinion that the quality of the statutory audit is not higher in a FYA. However, 
according to the respondents, the probability of errors during the audit in FYAs is 
higher. This result may be explained as follows. Although a new auditor can have a 
fresh perspective, he is unfamiliar with the listed company and its environment, and 
there are considerable costs for the new auditor to settle in. A statistically significant 
majority of the respondents endorse these higher costs. The annual financial report 
analysis also showed that auditors sometimes present a FYA as a KAM (Sect. 3.2.2). 
A further breakdown by the type of respondents shows that PIE auditors make a 
significantly more negative assessment of the claim that the quality of the audit is 
higher in a FYA than other respondents (see footnote a in Table 4).
The previous results are hard to reconcile with the desire to increase the quality 
of the audit by requiring audit firm rotation. This is even more so in light of the find-
ings of lower audit fees for AEX companies in FYAs (Sect. 3.2.3).
We also investigated the quality of audits in a LYA. The results are shown in 
Table 5.
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The matrix shows that a statistically significant majority of the respondents 
believe that the quality in a LYA is not higher. Nor is the likelihood of deficiencies 
during the statutory audit considered to be higher. According to a significant major-
ity of the respondents, the auditor does not act more independently in the LYA com-
pared to other audit years. This is not in line with our initial hypothesis that auditors 
would act more independently in a LYA, as there is not much to be gained from 
customer-friendliness and there is still a reputational risk for the auditor in the event 
of later discovered audit failures. In our analysis of annual financial reports, we also 
found indications that the quality of audits and the independence of auditors are not 
higher in LYAs, but rather lower (Sect. 3.2.2).
A further breakdown by the type of respondents shows that PIE auditors are more 
pronounced than other respondents in their rejection of the statements that the qual-
ity and the likelihood of deficiencies in a LYA are higher and that the auditor is 
more independent (footnote a of Table 5).
Finally, we asked the respondents similar questions about the DYA in the ques-
tionnaire. If there is a deviation between the LYA and DYA, there appears to be no 
relevant difference in the quality of the statutory audit between DYA and other audit 
years.
3.3.4  Improvements Regarding the Transition Between Incoming and Outgoing 
Auditor
We questioned stakeholders whether improvements could be made in the process of 
transferring information and responsibilities from the outgoing auditor or audit firm 
to the incoming auditor or audit firm, and if so, with regard to which aspects. As 
discussed, a hand-over file prepared by the outgoing auditor is seen by the European 
Commission as an important tool for preventing a loss of knowledge resulting from 
mandatory audit firm rotation (Sect. 2.1.2). Respondents could choose from the fol-
lowing answer options:
1. I do not see any possibilities for improvement;
2. The (collegial) consultations between the former auditor or audit firm and the 
successor auditor or audit firm;
3. The hand-over file with the proposed audit process provided by the former 
auditor or audit firm to the successor auditor or audit firm;
4. Providing relevant audit documentation in a hand-over file to the successor 
auditor of audit firm;
5. The successor auditor or audit firm attending meetings between the former 
auditor or audit firm and representatives of the audited company or organization, 
e.g. with members of the Board or audit committee;
6. The successor auditor or audit firm taking knowledge of the risk analysis of the 
former auditor of audit firm;
7. The successor auditor or audit firm conducting a review of the audit file;
8. No opinion;
9. Other.
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For the answer options listed above, we followed the terminology used by the 
Dutch Royal Netherlands Institute of Chartered Accountants.52 The results are 
depicted below in Fig. 3.
The results show that most respondents saw room for improvement, somewhat 
evenly distributed between the different topics. The hand-over file was seen by most 
respondents as an area for improvement. This is consistent with the European Com-
mission’s remark in the European Commission Impact Assessment that a hand-
over file is important. However, there are some dissenting voices. For example, one 
respondent remarked:
An extensively regulated transition process is far off from the idea that the new 
audit firm has a fresh perspective.
A good hand-over file may thus be useful, to the extent that it does not prejudice a 
potential fresh perspective. Currently, the Audit Regulation requires a hand-over file 
(see Sect. 2.1.3), but does not regulate its contents extensively. Future research may 
be beneficial to find out whether and how the transition process—and the use of a 
hand-over file—could further be improved.
4  Implications of the Dutch Experience for the EU and its Member 
States
4.1  No Change in Audit Regulation Required
The questionnaire among Dutch stakeholders shows statistically significant support 
for the mandatory audit firm rotation requirement in the Audit Regulation. Although 
this requirement was seen as controversial at the time of its adoption, it is now con-
sidered desirable by various stakeholders, including auditors themselves. Hence, this 
empirical study shows no support for the abolition or a softening of this requirement. 
Regarding the transition process between the incoming and outgoing audit firm, our 
survey suggested several areas for improvement. Further research is required to find 
out whether this should have any consequences for the Audit Regulation or supervi-
sory practices.
4.2  Aiming for High Quality of First and Last Year Audits
Our research suggests a higher probability of deficiencies in FYAs. This undermines 
the goal of improving audit quality through auditor independence. This risk may 
have been underestimated somewhat by the European legislator. Although the Euro-
pean Commission Impact Assessment mentioned the costs for audit firms to gain 
firm-specific knowledge of a PIE, and the costs for the PIE to familiarize the new 
52 Guidance paper 1134 of 5 November 2015, www.nba.nl/globa lasse ts/wet--en-regel gevin g/nba-handr 
eikin gen/nbaha ndrei king_1134_samen werki ng_voorg aande _en_opvol gende _accou ntant .pdf.
 B. de Jong et al.
123
auditor with its operations, it seemed that the European Commission was confident 
that carefully designed rules could sufficiently mitigate these risks. The discount on 
their audit fees that audit firms provide to lucrative larger PIEs—the trophy client 
effect—may exacerbate the negative effect on audit quality. This is because the dis-
count may lead to less man-hours being spent on the audit to prevent lower profit-
ability, whereas it is expected that a FYA—especially in the case of large PIEs—
probably requires more efforts (compared to other financial years) to achieve the 
same level of audit quality.
What can be done about the potential lower quality of FYAs? In our view, the 
role of auditors and audit firms, on the one hand, and the role of supervisors, listed 
companies and investors, on the other, should be distinguished. Auditors themselves 
have a professional responsibility to offer high quality audits. Audit firms are not 
only obliged to provide an environment making it possible for auditors to accomplish 
their professional duties, but audit firms are also required to have an effective assur-
ance quality system in place.53 In the Netherlands compliance with the professional 
standards by auditors can be enforced in disciplinary proceedings, whilst compli-
ance with the requirements applicable to audit firms is supervised by the AFM. The 
results of our research indicate that in order to substantiate the responsibilities of 
auditors and audit firms, investing a sufficient amount of resources, especially in the 















Fig. 3  Improvements in transition between incoming and outgoing auditor
53 Art. 24a and further, and Art. 29 Audit Directive.
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relationship with the PIE is crucial in this stage. Audit firms may follow the practice 
of some Dutch audit firms which consider FYAs a KAM.
With regard to the enforcement of the responsibilities of auditors and audit firms, 
PIEs, supervisors and investors have a role. The boards of PIEs—and, consequently, 
ultimately investors—should be careful in attaching too much importance to audit 
fees, i.e. low or lowering audit fees should not be the most important selection cri-
terion. This is, however, a consequence of the competition between audit firms to 
acquire clients during the audit rotation process and an inherent risk of a system 
in which the audit firm is selected and paid by (the general meeting or representa-
tives of) the audited entity. Furthermore, the boards of PIEs could consider, as good 
practice, to report on the quality of FYAs and the measures that have been taken in 
relation to that in the management report.
Regarding investors, it is recommended for them to increase their awareness and 
critical assessment of audit reports in FYAs. Investors could increase the possibility 
of discussing the audit quality, in particular with regard to a FYA, with the boards 
of PIEs and with the auditor at general meetings, assuming the auditor is present at 
the general meeting, which is common practice for Dutch listed companies.54 Inves-
tors should also ask for more awareness for the risk of lowballing during the general 
meeting in which the appointment of the audit firm is on the agenda; we note, how-
ever, that investors may have (financial) incentives to lower the costs of audit fees.
Finally, there is a role for the supervisors of audit firms. The results of our 
research suggest that supervisors could pay special attention to FYAs. Critical 
assessments of the performance of auditors and audit firms by the supervisors of 
FYAs may reduce the risk that audit firms offer higher discounts on their audit fees 
to specific companies (the trophy client effect) than from a perspective of enhanc-
ing high audit quality which would be desirable. Supervisors could also assess the 
performance of auditors and audit firms in the years in which the audit fees are sig-
nificantly lower than other years to mitigate some of the adverse consequences of 
the current system in which the audited entity seems to take into account the level of 
audit fees in their considerations of selecting an auditor firm.
The European Commission suggests that a good hand-over file provided by the 
outgoing auditor could mitigate quality problems in the FYA for the incoming audit 
firm. A more comprehensive hand-over file was seen as desirable by the largest 
number of respondents in our questionnaire. However, such an enhanced hand-over 
file should not be an impediment to a fresh perspective. Based on the outcomes of 
our survey, it seems that improvements in the regulation of the transition process are 
possible, but further research on how this can be achieved is necessary.
In our study of the annual financial statements of Dutch PIEs, we found that the 
quality of LYAs may also be lower. However, this result is not as robust as the per-
ceived lower quality of FYAs, given that the result was driven by only one proxy, 
i.e. the issuance of a profit warning or the recognition of an impairment. A lower 
54 Art. 117(5) of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code and best practice provision 4.1.9 of the Dutch corpo-
rate governance code.
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incidence of these events in LYAs could have other causes than lower audit quality. 
Further research is necessary as to whether and why mandatory audit firm rotation 
may also have an impact on audit quality in LYAs.
4.3  Market Structure and Market Failures
Our empirical study shows that in the Netherlands the Audit Regulation’s goals 
regarding improving market competition in the market for statutory audits and low-
ering barriers to market entry have not been met. The market for statutory audits is as 
concentrated as it was, being dominated by the Big Four. What are the implications 
of this finding for the EU? In our view, it is not very likely that the mandatory audit 
firm rotation requirement in the Audit Regulation can be designed in such a way that 
the competition goals can be met. Arguably, the concentrated market structure is a 
result of economic forces and the societal call for public regulation and oversight, 
resulting in significant—and increasing—compliance costs for audit firms. Smaller 
audit firms may lack the scale to allot these costs to sufficient audits, or may lack a 
sufficient network to consider bidding for an audit engagement of a company with a 
group structure consisting of subsidiaries acting globally or in various jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, aspects of unlimited civil liability for audit firms, regulatory oversight 
and the costs of regulation and lower audit fees, may discourage smaller audit firms. 
In particular with regard to the statutory audits of PIEs, economies of scale seem 
to be necessary. A recent development in the UK, where Grant Thornton UK LLP 
announced that it was leaving the market for big company audits stating that it is too 
difficult to compete with the Big Four, supports this conclusion.55 Also in the Neth-
erlands, audit firms leave the market for statutory audits of PIEs.56
In our research we did not aim to solve the concerns raised in the broader discus-
sion of addressing failures in the market for statutory audits. We believe the manda-
tory audit firm rotation requirement can only play a very limited role in addressing 
market failures. That is not to say that the requirement of mandatory audit firm rota-
tion in itself is the sole and sufficient measure for improving the quality of statutory 
audits. Concerns with regard to the quality of audits remain. Recently, the Interna-
tional Forum of Independent Audit Regulators identified problems in 40% of the 
audits they inspected.57 Suggestions have been made to break up the Big Four,58 to 
split off conducting statutory audits from other services and to change the way audi-
tors are paid, thus ensuring auditors’ independence.
55 See Maddison Marriage, ‘Grant Thornton exits audit market for big UK companies’, Financial Times, 
29 March 2018 (online) (‘The firm [Grant Thornton, authors] also worried that its inability to challenge 
the Big Four for FTSE 350 contracts—which often came down to its lack of extensive experience in this 
area—was bad for the morale of staff attempting to win these contracts.’).
56 Grant Thornton and Accon AVM already left the market for statutory PIEs in 2019. And also Baker 
Tilly recently announced that it was leaving this market as of 1 January 2020 at the latest.
57 IFIAR, Survey of Inspections Findings 2017 (IFIAR 2018, www.ifiar .org).
58 See e.g. ‘What the public should expect from auditors’, Financial Times, 14 March 2018 (online).
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Although with regard to the pros and cons of these suggestions the discussion 
has only started and the outcome is hard to predict, one thing seems to be certain. 
Despite the introduction of the mandatory audit form rotation requirement in Euro-
pean legislation in 2016, a fierce debate on the incentives and potential legislative 
measures for ensuring audit quality will continue in the coming years.
5  Conclusion
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007/2008, the Audit Regulation introduced 
mandatory audit firm rotation for PIEs. The preamble to the Audit Regulation 
mentions several aims to be achieved with the introduction of this requirement. 
The first is to reduce the ‘familiarity threat’ that looms in case of long audit 
engagements. This means reducing the risk that the auditor is too sympathetic to 
the interests of the company when in a close and long relationship, and the audi-
tor lacking a fresh view to suggest improvements. Related goals mentioned in 
the Audit Regulation are therefore reinforcing professional scepticism and audi-
tor independence. This should result in higher audit quality. Finally, mandatory 
audit firm rotation aims to improve the market for statutory audits, which is cur-
rently dominated by the Big Four. Market structure would improve by broadening 
the choice of statutory auditors and audit firms for PIEs and would improve by 
increasing competition.
In this article, we have described the outcome of our research into the effects 
of mandatory audit firm rotation in the Netherlands, with a particular focus on 
Dutch listed companies. Even though the Audit Regulation only required audit 
firm rotation as of 2020/2023, we have been able to examine these effects due to 
the particularities of the Dutch context. The Dutch legislator planned to intro-
duce a stricter mandatory audit firm rotation regime in national legislation. In 
anticipation of this legislation, which was originally expected to apply as of 1 
January 2014 and in a later stage as of 1 January 2016, many Dutch listed compa-
nies already rotated from audit firms. Eventually, the specific Dutch approach was 
abandoned and the Netherlands conformed to the rules of the Audit Regulation. 
The Netherlands did not use member state options to extend the maximum dura-
tion of audit engagements. Hence, mandatory audit firm rotation is required in the 
Netherlands after an audit engagement with a maximum duration of 10 years.
The effects of mandatory audit firm rotation have been studied by examining 
the annual financial reports of Dutch listed companies over the financial years 
2012–2016 (which included 74 rotations), and by conducting a survey among 
stakeholders. We have concluded that there is broad support for the mandatory 
audit firm rotation requirement in the Audit Regulation. Although the measures 
were seen as controversial at the time of their adoption, they are now considered 
desirable by various stakeholders, including auditors themselves.
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Mandatory audit firm rotation appears to have resulted in some adverse effects. 
Most notably, our study shows a higher probability of errors in so-called FYAs 
(first year audits). This seems to be one of the adverse consequences of the 
competition between audit firms that was initiated by the introduction of man-
datory audit firm rotation and inherent in a system in which the audited entity 
is authorized to select and pay the audit firm. To address this concern, we have 
made suggestions to all relevant stakeholders (companies, audit firms, supervi-
sors and investors), including the recommendation to supervisors to critically 
assess potential indications for lowballing during FYAs. The Audit Regulation’s 
goals to improve the market for statutory audits have so far failed. The market in 
the Netherlands was, and still is, dominated by the Big Four. Smaller audit firms 
have not been able or willing to enlarge their market share of audit engagements 
for PIEs. In our view, it is not very likely that the mandatory audit firm rotation 
requirement in the Audit Regulation can be designed in a such a way that this 
will change, as the current market structure with the dominance of four global 
audit firms is a consequence of economic forces requiring economies of scale. A 
broader discussion about concerns and possible reforms in the market for statu-
tory audits continues to be necessary. Mandatory audit firm rotation has only a 
very limited role to play in this respect.
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